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Following the end of the bipolar power competition between East and West in 1991, 
European militaries, including their air forces, underwent a significant process of 
transformation characterized by two major trends – concentration and transnationalization.1 
These trends resulted in the creation of smaller, but also more professional and specialized air 
forces, which started cooperating at an international level to a much larger extent.2  As a 
result, they have become more interconnected but also more interdependent than they were 
during the Cold War. Another trait characteristic of the post-Cold War period has been the 
increased number of multinational operations European air forces have been involved in as a 
logical result of concentration and transnationalization. Concentrated air forces became 
increasingly more reliant on supplementing their available capabilities through cooperation 
with allies. This is one of the reasons why multinational operations have become the 
dominant form of military intervention undertaken by European countries. Operation Allied 
Force (OAF) conducted in Kosovo in 1999, which was NATO’s first major military 
operation, is one example of this type of force application. It also serves as a good illustration 
of the challenges multinational operations present to participating air forces. 
 This chapter seeks to uncover the challenges that arose from the multinational nature 
of OAF and how they affected the cooperation of the NATO countries involved, as well as 
the effectiveness of the operation. It will show that the experience of multinational operations 
in OAF set into motion the development of various forms of multinational cooperation within 
European NATO members and the alliance as a whole, further increasing the 
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transnationalization of European air forces. Investigating the major difficulties and lessons 
learnt from this operation, this chapter particularly highlights the issue of national caveats and 
the capability gap between the US Air Force (USAF) and the rest of the alliance evident in 
equipment shortages and interoperability problems. 
The chapter starts with a brief discussion of OAF and its significance to provide the 
necessary background for investigating the challenges it presented. Secondly, it looks closer 
at the concepts of military concentration and transnationalization as factors leading to 
enhanced multinational cooperation. The main part of the chapter will discuss the major 
challenges encountered in OAF. Finally, it will look at how they were addressed at the time 
of the operation and how they affected the further transnationalization of European air forces. 
Operation Allied Force 
 OAF  started on 24 March 1999 following the unsuccessful talks in Rambouillet 
(France) between Serbian leaders and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).3 The operation’s 
objective was to stop the genocide committed by the forces of Yugoslavian President, 
Slobodan Milosevic against the citizens of the Kosovo province.4 OAF’s approach was 
characterized by the intention to gradually extend the range of targets during three phases in 
order to achieve its stated objectives and to coerce Milosevic to capitulate.5 Following 78 
days and 38,004 sorties flown, the operation finished on 10 June 1999 after Milosevic’s 
capitulation and agreement to withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo.6 
All of the then-19 NATO countries officially supported the intervention, but they 
contributed to the operation to a very different extent.7 For example, the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg and Poland did not provide any aircraft or combat 
forces. Their input was minimal since only Greece and Hungary contributed to the military 
effort with basing locations and the right to fly over their territories.8 The most sizeable 
contributions to OAF were made by the US, France, the UK, the Netherlands, Italy and 
Germany. Their parts in the operation involved flying approximately 29,000 (the US), 2,414 
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(France), 1,950 (the UK), 1,252 (the Netherlands), 1,081 (Italy) and 636 (Germany) sorties.9 
The three largest aircraft contributors were the US, France and the UK with the Americans 
providing over 700 aircraft out of the total 1,055 deployed by the alliance.10 Furthermore, the 
US, France and the UK were also the only alliance members who contributed precision 
guided munitions (PGMs).11 
 The extent to which OAF was an unambiguous airpower success, or was won by 
airpower alone, has been widely debated.12 On the one hand, the operation clearly succeeded 
inasmuch as it achieved its objectives and coerced Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo. On 
the other hand, as General Wesley Clark pointed out, “though NATO had succeeded in its 
first armed conflict, it didn’t feel like a victory”.13 What he meant was that it was not entirely 
clear if it was solely the air operation that caused Milosevic to capitulate.14 Whatever the 
rights or wrongs of this debate, OAF was certainly a significant operation for two reasons. 
Firstly, it justified the alliance’s continuing existence which was questioned after the 
Soviet Union – the opponent NATO was created to defend against in the first place – had 
ceased to exist. OAF was NATO’s first major military operation and, as such marked its 
transformation from a predominantly defensive organization into one getting involved in 
offensive activities.15 Secondly, as will be demonstrated further in the chapter, OAF revealed 
significant challenges to cooperation within the alliance, which determined the future course 
for development of various multinational initiatives enhancing NATO’s collective capability 
and capacity. These challenges can be grouped into two main categories: national caveats 
affecting, for example, the decision-making process, and a significant capability gap between 
the US and the rest of the alliance evident in interoperability issues between participating air 
forces and the systems they used. These challenges were to be expected in a large 
multinational operation. However, because it was NATO’s first major military intervention, 
which moreover took place while many of the participating air forces were still undergoing 
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structural and organizational changes, it made clear which areas needed to be addressed to 
improve the effectiveness of future operations. Therefore, as this chapter shows, OAF 
initiated the further transnationalization of NATO air forces, especially in Europe.  
Post-Cold War transnationalization of the air forces and its consequences 
The end of the Cold War bi-polar order initiated a military transformation of NATO 
and some former Warsaw Pact air forces effecting their growing engagement in multinational 
operations. This process took the form of concentration and transnationalization, leading to a 
change in the quantity and quality of the affected forces. At this point it is vital to mention 
that both processes affected predominantly the European air forces. The USAF, although it 
also underwent certain changes, retained its full-spectrum of capabilities. 
The concentration of European air forces was a logical consequence of the end of the 
Cold War, which at the time seemed to designate the threat of large-scale, conventional 
conflict in Europe as a relic of the past. With a dramatically changed security environment, 
many European states stopped prioritizing large-scale conventional military capabilities, 
decreased their military expenditure, and started the process of reducing existing forces.16 For 
example, in the UK, that process was initiated with two defense reviews published by the 
Conservative Government, namely Options for Change from 1990–1991 and Front Line First 
from 1994 addressing predominantly the reduction of defence budgets. The table below 
illustrates the reduction in personnel in the Air Forces of the six aforementioned major 
contributors to the OAF.  
 
Table 1. Total air forces personnel for major OAF contributors in 1990 and 1999. 
Country Personnel in 1990 Personnel in 1999 
the US 571,000 361,400 
France 93,100 76,400 
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Country Personnel in 1990 Personnel in 1999 
Germany17 106,000 76,400 
Italy 79,600 61,900 
the Netherlands 17,400 11,980 
the UK 89,600 55,200 
Source: “NATO and Non-NATO Europe,” The Military Balance 99, no. 1 (1999): 30–103; 
“The Alliances and Europe,” The Military Balance 90, no. 1 (1990): 44–96; “United States,” 
The Military Balance 99, no. 1 (1999): 12–29; “United States,” The Military Balance 90, no. 
1 (1990): 12–27. 
 
However, military concentration did not merely mean a decrease in the size of 
military forces. Its ultimate goal was the creation of compact and specialized professional 
units that seemed more relevant to the new security environment.18 Another characteristic of 
that process was the contractorization of the militaries, which involved outsourcing certain 
services to the private sector rather than having them delivered by the military or the civil 
service.19 In the UK the move was initiated in the 1980s and is still being continued until the 
present day involving a whole array of activities ranging from office support to supporting 
expeditionary military operations, for example in Afghanistan.20 Therefore, it should not be 
viewed solely as a decline. Because of the transformation they had fewer resources and 
personnel but, as Anthony King argued, the transformed armed forces that emerged were also 
“qualitatively different” from their pre-1990 counterparts since they benefitted from targeted 
investment in specific prioritized areas.21 As a result, armed forces that had focused on mass 
and in many cases were maintained through universal conscription, evolved into smaller, 
professional and more specialized forces. These were better suited to operations at the lower 
end of the conflict spectrum, such as, for example, peacekeeping, peace support or 
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humanitarian interventions requiring deeper cooperation between military and civilian sectors 
than the “traditionally” perceived military functions.22  
Unfortunately for the European air forces military concentration, although leading to 
the creation of specialized and more effective units, did not allow for building or maintaining 
a full spectrum of air power capabilities. Certainly, no European air force could compete with 
the USAF as the most powerful air force in the world. Therefore, with the budgetary cuts, 
reorganization and personnel reduction, investment in one capability was often made at the 
expense of another. A logical solution to this problem was increased cooperation among 
European air forces, which allowed individual states to make up for shortcomings in certain 
areas and maintaining military capability. Such multinational engagement ultimately led to 
increasing interoperability, but also interdependence resulting in, what King called military 
transnationalization.23 
Multinational military cooperation as such, of course, was not a new phenomenon in 
the post-Cold war period. States have cooperated in the military sphere and worked in ad-hoc 
coalitions for centuries. Nevertheless, from 1991 onwards, cooperation started taking place 
more frequently across the whole military structure, not only at the strategic level but also 
operational and tactical, leading to the creation of truly multinational forces within coalitions. 
As such, it also uncovered previously unknown challenges and difficulties, potentially 
disrupting the smooth running of missions and affecting the effectiveness of operations. 
Challenges Faced in Operation Allied Force 
 Multinational operations are complex undertakings. They involve forces from 
different nations coming from different cultural backgrounds, representing different 
approaches and bringing their own, not always compatible, equipment, procedures and 
regulations to the coalition. OAF was NATO’s first major military intervention conducted in 
a changing security environment. As such, it faced significant challenges arising from 




According to NATO’s definition national caveats are “any limitation, restriction or 
constraint imposed by a nation on its military forces or civilian elements under NATO 
command and control or otherwise available to NATO, that does not permit NATO 
commanders to deploy and employ these assets fully in line with the approved operation 
plan.”24 The imposition of national caveats by individual states is the norm in multinational 
operations for various reasons. First and foremost, they are imposed as a means of control 
over deployed national forces in order to minimize the costs and risks they will be exposed 
to.25 Secondly, caveats often reflect specific domestic political considerations of nations 
involved in a coalition and multinational operations. As such, national caveats might 
represent, for example, a compromise between political parties with different views on the 
country’s involvement in a particular operation or a way to ensure that the activities 
performed by the deployed forces will not damage  national interests or the country’s or its 
leaders’ image, both domestically and internationally, through negative publicity.26 Following 
from the last point, national caveats may be imposed according to what foreign policy 
behavior is considered appropriate or desirable by individual states in various conditions. 
Therefore, national caveats are also often linked to a nation’s cultural and historical 
background – the values and perceptions shared by society as a whole.27 
As Anthony Cordesman pointed out, political constraints as a result of national 
caveats, rather than capability shortcomings, were “the most serious single problem” in the 
conduct of OAF.28 The restraints posed by national caveats on the effectiveness of missions 
was visible in the process of decision-making especially pertaining to the approval of targets. 
However, it was also reflected in the attitude which the involved countries presented towards 
the air strikes and military intervention in general as opposed to the option to solve the 
conflict by diplomatic means.  
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In the run-up to OAF, there was a noticeable trend for alliance members that were 
geographically closest to the area of operations to be the most reluctant about a military 
solution to the conflict, the escalation of air strikes once the operations had started, and the 
option of deploying ground troops.29 For example, the states most determined to find a non-
military solution to the conflict were Italy and Greece. Considering that these countries are 
direct neighbors of Yugoslavia, such a stance should not have come as a surprise. Both 
countries, in the case of a military intervention, would be the first to be affected by its effects 
such as, for example, large number of refugees seeking shelter from the conflict.30 The stance 
represented by Italy and Greece was an explicit example of their leaderships’ efforts to 
protect their national interest, in this case, to maintain regional stability, while avoiding at the 
same time political marginalization and remaining viable members of NATO.31 Ultimately, 
both Italy and Greece supported the operation, but also continued pushing for a peaceful 
solution and restraint, even once the air strikes had commenced.  The Italian government 
continued its efforts to re-start the negotiations in order to resolve the conflict through 
diplomatic means, and the Greek leadership succeeded in convincing Milosevic to put 
forward a cease-fire offer for the duration of the Orthodox Easter. The latter, however, was 
rejected as not reliable by the coalition and the air strikes did not stop.32 The stance of the 
Italian government presents a particularly interesting case considering that, after all, Italy in 
practice was one of the major contributors of personnel and aircraft to the operation. 
Germany’s motivation for supporting the operation was the wish to strengthen the 
country’s position in the international arena. The desire to improve its international image by 
standing firm against genocide and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was influenced by the 
country’s past and the atrocities committed in its name during the Second World War.33 At 
the same time, precisely because of its military past, Germany shared Italy’s and Greece’s 
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determination to resolve the conflict by diplomatic means and to minimize the use of lethal 
force, decisively standing against escalation and the introduction of ground forces.34  
A contrasting approach and attitude towards intervention in Kosovo was taken by the 
UK,  which was by far more assertive, or “hawkish”, as Olivier Schmitt called it.35 To 
strengthen their position within the alliance and their relationship with the US, the UK was 
not only firmly lobbying for a military intervention to coerce Milosevic into stopping the 
atrocities, but it was also one of the few NATO members that insisted on not ruling out the 
ground option. This stance was very much in line with the UK’s 1998 Strategic Defence 
Review, which set the direction for transforming the British Armed Forces into highly-
deployable expeditionary units able to respond to a series of new threats and forms of 
conflict, including humanitarian interventions.36 It was also concurrent with Tony Blair’s 
‘Doctrine of the International Community’ in which he advocated for the need of 
multinational cooperation and international response to the arising crises in the Balkan 
region.37  
National interest also dictated the support of OAF by some smaller countries, 
especially the newest members of NATO, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
In spite of their minimal practical contribution, expressing support for the operation was 
extremely important for them, because it was an opportunity to demonstrate that they were a 
useful and committed member of the alliance, as well as a valuable ally of the US.38 As such, 
it is clear that national interests and domestic politics played a major role in shaping the way 
in which individual NATO members approached the operation. 
Once OAF had commenced, some countries’ reluctance vis-à-vis their engagement in 
a fully-fledged air campaign was also mirrored in the process of target selection. As pointed 
out by General Wesley Clark, in contrast to the US, European members of the alliance on the 
whole were less willing to strike strategically sensitive targets like, for example, 
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communication lines, bridges, radio and television stations or the power grid, in order to 
avoid antagonizing the Serbian population and causing excessive destruction in the country.39 
Such an approach was especially represented by the French who, out of all 19 NATO 
members, most often used their right to veto air strikes against critical infrastructure in Serbia 
as well as targets located in Montenegro.40 Lack of unanimous decision on target approval 
certainly caused a lot of friction in the alliance. It had the potential for serious consequences, 
for example, by endangering allied forces as a result of the inability to destroy surface-to-air 
missiles in Montenegro, because of repetitive French vetoes.41  
The process of target authorization was further complicated by the presence of 
parallel command structures in OAF. Alongside the NATO chain of command there were 
national chains of command, which complicated decision making. For example, after a target 
was approved by General Clark at the Supreme Allied Command Europe, it also had to go 
through a similar review in all participating states.42 This procedure not only complicated 
target approval, but also caused confusion with regards to command and control and 
responsibility for performing a particular task.43 There was another downside of parallel 
decision-making. As General Clark noted, the prolonged process of target approval often 
involved the public discussion of potential targets, thereby making them known to Serbian 
forces, which obviously hampered the effectiveness of air strikes.44  
Although potentially destructive for the alliance and certainly frustrating for the 
participating forces, friction resulting from national caveats did not ultimately destroy 
coalition coherence and unity during OAF.  As the operation progressed, the alliance learned 
from the process and set out to implement lessons identified immediately. For example, by 
the end of the first week of the operation the US, the UK, France, Germany and Italy agreed 
on a list of points to be used as a guidance for the US on target authorization which, once 
followed, would prevent the European allies from using their veto.45 As a compromise, 
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targets in Montenegro were excluded unless they posed a direct threat to allied forces. Any 
targets within five nautical miles of Belgrade required approval, as did air strikes that could 
incur significant civilian casualties or that targeted the power grid.46 Although this guidance 
was only prepared and agreed on after OAF had started, it was able to take into account the 
participating states’ major national caveats and limited friction within the alliance regarding 
target authorization.  
Nevertheless, the introduced guidelines did not completely prevent collateral damage 
as the allies wished. As reported, OAF included over 30 cases of unintended damage due to 
identification and targeting errors out of which twelve involved civilian casualties.47 The 
latter ones were widely publicized in media and had an enormous effect on the conduct of the 
operation. The targeting mistakes included, for example, confusing civilian vehicles 
containing refugees for a military convoy on the road between Djakovica and Decane in 
south-east Kosovo, accidentally bombing a bridge in southern Serbia while a passenger train 
was crossing it or bombing Chinese embassy in Belgrade as a result of mistaking it for a 
building of military purposes.48 The latter one probably had the most adverse effect on the 
conduct of the operation as it not only led to stopping any bombings in Belgrade for two 
weeks but also caused a diplomatic crisis between the US and China.49 In general, these 
targeting errors had a two-fold effect. Firstly, they directly influenced the introduction of very 
strict rules of engagement as discussed above. Secondly, they contributed to the unrealistic 
expectations set for the operation. As Benjamin Lambeth pointed out, the approach of zero 
casualties and no unintended damage to non-military infrastructure was adopted as almost a 
measure of the success of OAF and hence air power - the perceived perfectly precise tool, 
underwent a stringent judgement under unrealistic standards.50 
Capability gap between the US and European Allies 
 The operation in Kosovo revealed a significant capability gap between the USAF and 
the air forces of European NATO members. This was especially visible in such areas as 
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PGMs and command, control and communications systems, but also in air transport and air-
to-air refueling capabilities.  
 As a result of military concentration, European air forces had significantly reduced in 
size, which had further increased the capability gap with the US. The below table illustrates 
the number of active personnel and aircraft of the US and European NATO members in 1999. 
 
Table 2. NATO air forces personnel and inventory strength in 1999. 
Country Active personnel Total number of aircraft 
Belgium 11,500 221 
Czech Republic 15,400 291 
Denmark 4,700 110 
France 76,400 984 
Germany 76,400 837 
Greece 30,170 611 
Hungary 11,500 344 
Iceland   
Italy 61,900 633 
Luxembourg   
The Netherlands 11,980 304 
Norway 6,700 142 
Poland 55,300 650 
Portugal 7,445 150 
Spain 29,100 558 
Turkey 63,000 775 
The UK 55,200 1,023 
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Country Active personnel Total number of aircraft 
European allies total 516,695 7,633 
The US 361,400 6,178 
Source: “NATO and Non-NATO Europe,” 30–103; “United States,” 12–29. 
 
The table shows that, at the time of OAF, the USAF had approximately 70% of the personnel 
and 81% of the aircraft inventory when compared to the resources possessed collectively by 
the European NATO members. As such it vividly illustrates the mentioned capability and 
capacity gap. The numbers given for the European air forces include a large variety of 
different types of aircraft that vastly differed in quality. For example, they include several 
different types and generations of combat aircraft and helicopters that were not always 
compatible such as, for example, Soviet Su-22s or MiG-29s on one hand and F-16s or 
different versions of Tornado aircraft on the other.51 At the same time, the number of 
available transport or reconnaissance aircraft was low and only a few European air forces had 
any refueling capability, not even to mention PGMs.52 The type and quality of platforms and 
their compatibility are more important than quantity, because they affect the effectiveness of 
an operation, especially when it is conducted in a multilateral setting. Add to this the 
differences in doctrine, training and procedures and it is easy to see that European NATO air 
forces, even with an impressive quantity of personnel and equipment, did not amount to a 
joint “European Air Force” with full spectrum capabilities.   
 In OAF, the US contributed the vast majority of material resources. The USAF, as 
already mentioned, provided over 700 out of 1,055 aircraft and 23,315 – 83% - of all 
munitions used in the operation, both precision and non-precision.53 The largest contributors 
of aircraft from among the European air forces were France with approximately 100 aircraft, 
the UK and Italy.54 However, the contribution of the other European allies should not be 
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diminished who, in addition to some aircraft, provided crucial basing facilities for American 
assets. In total the non-US allies flew approximately 40% of the missions.55 Some European 
allies proved extremely valuable in specific mission areas, making up for other shortcomings. 
For example, Germany and Italy could not contribute with PGMs since they did not possess 
such capability, but they excelled in the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).56 
One of the major shortcomings revealed during OAF was the limited access to PGMs. 
Considering the aforementioned concerns expressed by some of the coalition members about 
offensive operations and minimizing the number of casualties, use of that type of munitions 
would be crucial to meeting those objectives. However, during the operation PGMs 
constituted 35% of all the weapons used, but only three of the participating states (US and to 
a lesser extent France and the UK) were able to deliver them, which placed a strain on the 
USAF.57 Moreover, after the operation had commenced, it became evident that many of the 
deployed European fighter aircraft presented very little operational usefulness as they could 
not conduct strikes with PGMs, and rarely were able to operate in all-weather or night 
conditions.58 These disparities only stressed the size of the capability gap between the US and 
the rest of the alliance. 
Another area which revealed a significant limitation of European air forces’ 
capabilities was air-to-air refueling (AAR). Again, most of the tanker aircraft (over 170) were 
provided by the US while the European allies deployed only 13.59 Considering that 21% of all 
sorties performed in OAF were AAR-related, the number of specialized aircraft contributed 
by European air forces seemed almost insignificant. Furthermore, the cooperation in the AAR 
area was also disrupted by the interoperability issues between the UK tankers and some of the 
US aircraft. Undoubtedly, the RAF provided a significant share of AAR in OAF as illustrated 
by the fact that 85% of the fuel the British tankers supplied was received by non-British 
aircraft.60 The UK was also the sole NATO member which had the Joint Tactical Information 
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Distribution System installed in their tanker aircraft and therefore proved to be one of the 
most interoperable AAR fleet in the operation.61 Nevertheless, refueling turned out to be 
problematic between the British and American aircraft. According to Air Vice Marshal Steve 
Nicholl, the RAF was able to refuel the US Navy and the US Marine Corps aircraft but was 
not compatible with the USAF platforms except for the F-16s which are widely sold among 
other nations and therefore present fewer interoperability problems.62 Considering that the US 
provided the largest number of aircraft to the operation and the UK was one of the major 
AAR providers that situation presented a serious interoperability issue. 
Similar limitations were present in the area of airlift, electronic warfare assets used in 
support of SEAD and delivered mostly by the US, as well as reconnaissance, especially the 
lack of a system for intelligence gathering and processing independent from that operated by 
the US.63 The shortcomings in the area of strategic airlift were partially mitigated by the UK, 
for example, through the use of commercial assets.64 Nevertheless, following the end of the 
operation, that particular capability was identified by European allies as one of the most 
urgent limitations of European air power.  
The capability gap in providing reconnaissance was partially filled by the deployment 
of US and European unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the operation, which provided the 
allied forces with precise, real-time, reconnaissance and surveillance information. UAVs 
were also used in the process of target approval, cross-checking the information on potential 
targets gathered by the alliance’s pilots.65 Out of the European contributors, both France and 
Germany deployed UAVs to OAF, which performed 37% of the unmanned sorties. However, 
these could fly only very short distances and, therefore, the amount of reconnaissance data 
they could gather was significantly reduced.66 Nevertheless, the introduction of unmanned 
platforms to OAF significantly improved the quality of reconnaissance missions performed. 
However, the lack of an intelligence gathering and processing system that was independent 
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from the US, presented a significant problem for the European allies. Since they did not 
possess such capability, they were completely reliant on the information supplied by the US. 
After OAF concluded, several European nations such as France, Germany and Italy, 
undertook steps to improve that particular capability by expanding their UAV fleets and 
cooperating on military communications satellites programmes (France and Germany).67  
The capability gap revealed during OAF was not only a matter of differences in 
available technology, but also became visible in serious interoperability issues. When OAF 
was launched in 1999, NATO as an alliance, with the exception of the three Central European 
members that had joined recently, already had five decades of experience in joint training and 
cooperation towards greater standardization and interoperability. For example, in preparation 
for a conflict with the Warsaw Pact, the allied forces trained together on annual basis in an 
exercise Reforger aimed at building NATO’s ability to deploy their forces to West 
Germany.68 Moreover, some of NATO members’ air forces also regularly took part in the 
Red Flag exercise organized by the USAF.69 Therefore, one might have expected that the 
integration of forces in OAF would run seamlessly. In the event it became clear that 
experience in peacetime training and joint exercises did not easily translate into the smooth 
conduct of an actual military operation. The most serious interoperability issue uncovered in 
OAF was related to communications capability. The problem was two-fold: firstly, there was 
no common communication and information exchange network that could be used by the US 
and NATO, and secondly, the existing systems used by individual allies were not 
compatible.70 This not only affected the smooth and timely exchange of information, but also 
the security of data transmission. This particular shortcoming hampered cooperation at all 
levels – from strategic through operational to tactical. The existing secure systems were often 
not suited to sending large amounts of data and got easily overloaded. For example, NATO’s 
Limited Operational Capability for Europe system, which was used in OAF for forwarding 
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air tasking orders, could only send a very limited amount of data.71 The lack of secure 
channels, like telephone lines and radio frequencies, in addition to the limited capacity of the 
existing systems, forced the participating air forces to use non-encrypted channels to forward 
sensitive information. This increased the possibility of interception by Serbian forces. The 
other option was to deliver sensitive information in writing for the rest of the allies to enter 
manually into their national systems and databases, unnecessarily prolonging the delivery and 
processing of information.72 Both solutions significantly reduced the effectiveness of the 
operation, especially in relation to mobile targets which, by the time the information was 
processed and air strike launched, could be in a completely different location. 
 Cooperation in OAF was disrupted by national caveats as well as a significant 
capability gap between the USAF and European NATO members, which was reflected in the 
lack of crucial equipment and non-interoperability and non-compatibility of the existing 
national systems. These major limitations served as a catalyst for developing efforts aimed at 
overcoming them, once OAF had been completed.   
Setting the course for improving the transnationalization of European air forces 
 OAF, as NATO’s first major military intervention, set the course for addressing issues 
that had resulted from the transnationalization of European air forces and ensuring their 
compatibility. The issue that raised the biggest concerns after OAF was the aforementioned 
capability gap between the USAF and the rest of NATO. It was identified as the most urgent 
problem to deal with and hence, the development of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) 
was prioritized immediately.73  
 DCI was approved at the Washington summit in April 1999 and aimed at bridging the 
capability gap between NATO members and improving their interoperability.74 This 
objective was to be achieved through focusing on areas such as deployability, mobility, 
sustainability and survivability of allied forces, as well as logistics, effective management and 
command and control.75 Focusing on the abovementioned military capabilities, DCI 
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identified 58 goals towards upgrading these areas. Some goals, like training, increased 
cooperation and coordination between allies, were considered relatively quick to implement 
and cost-effective. Others, like modernization of existing equipment, required greater 
investment of time and money.76A High Level Steering Group (HLSG) was created at the 
summit and put in charge of overseeing the implementation of the Initiative. One of the 
substantial improvements leading towards achieving DCI’s objectives and recognized by the 
HLSG was the introduction of the concept of a Multinational Joint Logistics Centre, aimed at 
the creation of an integrated allied system for theatre logistics.77  
OAF made it unambiguously clear that some of the areas identified in the DCI needed 
to be prioritized in order to work towards closing the capability gap between the US and 
Europe. Initially, all of the set objectives had equal priority. However, after OAF had 
concluded it became clear that two of them were more urgent for the European allies – 
forces’ deployability and sustainability and agreement on common goals in defense 
expenditure.78 
The initiative presented promising opportunities for the improvement of cooperation 
within NATO as an alliance. All of the allied states understood DCI was a long-term 
commitment. However, in spite of this common understanding they had quite different 
perceptions of how it should be conducted. For example, because of its focus on the concept 
of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the promotion of advanced equipment, the initiative 
was criticized as being affordable only for the more powerful members of NATO such as, for 
example, the UK, France or Germany leaving out the smaller, less wealthy states.79 Those 
smaller states, especially the new Central and Eastern European members, perceived DCI as a 
long-term goal that should be implemented after their militaries had adapted to match the 
standards set by NATO.80 The perceptions of DCI represented by the larger European NATO 
countries also varied. For example, Germany had a very selective approach to the set goals 
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and was interested in working towards only a few of them, namely strategic airlift, command 
and control and intelligence. In contrast, the UK and France considered the initiative’s 
objectives as confirmation of the course of military restructuration and modernization they 
had adopted.81 The US in turn, perceived it as a solution to upgrade the European armed 
forces and to close the capability gap.82 Those differing perceptions and the imposition of 
national caveats interrupted multinational cooperation and, as a result, affected the success of 
the initiative. Certainly, DCI correctly identified areas that needed work to bridge the gap 
between the US and European militaries. Nevertheless, it did not contribute significantly to 
the development of the necessary capabilities.83 National caveats about the utility of military 
force and the kind of armed forces required by the individual European NATO members were 
therefore an obstacle in the successful implementation of the DCI. 
When OAF had been completed, the allied air forces commenced some efforts to 
address the revealed technological gap. Those countries that could afford it started to build 
their own high-tech systems. For example, to address the PGMs shortage, France was 
developing the Advanced Air-to-Surface Missile.84 The majority of allies, aware of budgetary 
constraints, however, opted to address the capability gap by intensifying their participation in 
various cooperative initiatives and programs in order to pursue the goals set by the DCI. For 
example, after OAF, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the UK 
agreed on the procurement of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) to make up for the 
PGMs shortcoming.85 JDAM is a kit that facilitates the conversion of non-guided munitions 
into PGMs and, since it uses the Global Positioning System (GPS), also upgrades them with 
all-weather capability.86 As such it offered a much cheaper option of acquiring PGM 




A priority area in improving the cohesion and integration of NATO air forces was to 
ensure the unification of policies and procedures, especially in the area of C4 – command, 
control, communications and computers.87 Viewed as equally important for future operations 
were unified tactics, agreement on the military or diplomatic means used to resolve the 
particular conflict and the perception of strategic objectives which all should be clearly set 
out in allied publications. Hence, the importance of continuing to write allied joint 
publications (AJP) and establishing a common NATO doctrine was also stressed.88 Setting 
overarching standards for all NATO members was quite perceived rightly as the way to 
ensure interoperability and minimize friction among participants in any future operation. 
Finally, as pointed out in the Department of Defense’s report to the US Congress, 
“operation Allied Force also validated the need for joint, integrated training among the 
Services to enhance their ability to execute both, joint and coalition air operations.”89 While 
this statement referred to the US armed forces specifically, it may be perceived as a general 
lesson from OAF applicable for all NATO member states and their air forces. Coalition 
building requires interoperability among its members and that comes, firstly, from 
standardized procedures, and secondly, from experience of working together.  
The above section discussed how the experience from OAF stressed the importance of 
solid multinational cooperation among the allied air forces and shaped the development of 
different initiatives to build collective military capability and capacity. The cooperative 
multinational initiatives pursued under DCI were important for European air forces, 
especially for the smaller ones. Many European states could not afford to buy significant 
amounts of new equipment or, what would have been even more expensive, to develop their 
own systems to make up for existing limitations and build a fully capable air force. The 
majority therefore resorted to various multinational initiatives based on the idea of pooling 
21 
 
and sharing resources which offer a (cost-)effective way of accessing necessary equipment 
and boosting operational capability.90 
Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the challenges encountered by NATO air forces in 
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo within the framework of acting in a multinational 
operation. Identifying the main problems pertaining to cooperation in OAF as national 
caveats and the capability gap between the US and the rest of the alliance, it argued that 
lessons identified during the operation set the course for further transnationalization of 
European air forces.  
Undoubtedly, OAF could be perceived as a milestone in the history of NATO’s 
multinational operations. Firstly, it validated the very existence of the Alliance and set a 
course for its future engagements. Not only was Allied Force the first major military 
operation conducted by NATO, but it was carried out in the new, post-Cold War security 
environment in which the alliance’s prime opponent, and the very reason for its 
establishment, ceased to exist. The operation and its outcome did not live up to the overly 
optimistic initial hopes of some that it could be concluded within days, but did prove that the 
alliance was still an important organization with much potential to be used in resolving 
conflicts and in answering crises arising in the challenging post-1990 reality.  
Secondly, OAF highlighted the serious challenges that multinational cooperation may 
bring. A lack of compatible equipment and standardized procedures, parallel command 
structures and over-reliance on US resources disrupted the conduct of the operation and 
highlighted the urgency for improving interoperability within the alliance. However, the 
operation in Kosovo not only identified areas of serious capability and capacity limitations, 
especially among the European allies, but also made it clear that in its current shape, NATO, 
not to mention its individual members, would not be able to oppose a peer competitor. The 
situation in Kosovo was characterized by asymmetry on the sides of the conflict where the 
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alliance, despite all of the problematic issues, had an undeniable advantage over Milosevic’s 
forces. In a conflict with a more equal opponent that capability gap, together with 
interoperability issues and overly restraining national caveats, could have had a significantly 
more adverse effect on the operation. Therefore, it can be asserted that the drive towards 
multinational cooperation and to addressing these challenges has re-gained particular 
importance recently, when the threat of state-on-state conflict has again been elevated to the 
political agenda as a result of the rise of China and Russia.91  
The process of military transformation taking place among the armed forces and 
shrinking defense budgets ensured that multinationality became the dominant form of post-
Cold War military interventions and the issues identified during OAF needed to be addressed 
for cooperation to be effective.  Increased multinational cooperation in the form of DCI was 
prioritized as a solution. The DCI initiative was developed into another related effort, Smart 
Defence, however the objectives remained unchanged – to build a collective military 
capability and, at the same time, to provide NATO members with a cost-effective way to 
access required capabilities and gain the necessary experience in using them. In spite of the 
efforts since OAF, the capability gap between the USAF and European air forces had not 
been resolved more than a decade later as demonstrated by Operation Unified Protector in 
Libya in 2011 (see chapter twelve).92  
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